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Abstract
We analyze individual decisions of when to face difficult tasks. Al-
though threatening, difficult tasks provide better economic outcomes than
easy ones. We argue how individual dispositions, i.e., the expression of
some non-cognitive dimensions, might drive timing decisions. Specifically,
when experiencing low dispositions, individuals get trapped into low value
easy tasks while when experiencing high dispositions, they are willing to
always deal with high value difficult tasks. Also, when outcome achieve-
ments motivate individuals, they move from low value easy tasks to high
value difficult tasks. This finding is interpreted as individuals preparing
themselves to cope with difficulties.
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1 Introduction
One of the reasons as to why individuals tend to avoid difficult tasks is because
they do not feel able enough to confront with them. Not coping with them might,
however, imply foregoing the opportunity of getting better economic outcomes, not
available otherwise. As Liebow (1967) documents in his study of the Negro male
community of Washington inner city:
“Convinced of their inadequacies, not only do they not seek out those few better-
paying jobs which test their resources, but actively avoid them, gravitating in a mass
to the menial, routine jobs which offer no challenge -and therefore posse not threat-
to the already diminished images they have of themselves(...). Thus, the man‘s low
self-esteem generates a fear of being tested and prevents him from accepting a job
with responsibilities or, once on a job, form staying with it if responsibilities are
thrust on him, even if wages are commensurably higher.”
The story above offers two interesting insights. The first one is that individual dis-
positions might dramatically influence decisions of huge economic relevance. When
documenting the relationship between the achievement motive and upward mobility
patterns in the United States, Atkinson and Feather (1966) highlight how, despite of
the fact that education is the main determinant of upward mobility, individual dis-
positions should not be neglected. In fact, 65% of the people who exhibited upward
mobility patterns at a higher extent, only had high school education or less.1 The
second one is the trade-off between task difficulty and economic outcomes. While
a routine job is probably more easily developed than a very demanding one, bet-
ter economic outcomes, as higher wages or promotion opportunities, might only be
available in the latter.2
Our purpose in this paper is to understand and highlight the role played by indi-
vidual dispositions in shaping avoidance behavior. We interpret individual disposi-
tions as an expression of non-cognitive abilities.3 Examples of non-cognitive abilities
are emotional stability, that manifests, among others aspects, in self-confidence and
self-esteem, or conscientiousness, that manifests, among others aspects, in persever-
1To establish comparisons between the prestige of occupations of parents and sons, private households populated
by people older than 21 were interviewed. Specific measures related to individual dispositions to strive for success
(i.e., the achievement motive) were collected.
2Also, as Atkinson and Feather (1966) suggest, high prestige occupations are perceived as being more difficult
to attain than low prestige occupations. This hierarchy can be seen as a series of tasks in which the outcome value
comes together with difficulty.
3We will interchangeably use the term state, disposition or simply ability when referring to the non-cognitive
ability level that the individual enjoys.
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ance.4 In order to do it, we develop a tractable model in which the decision maker,
henceforth DM, who is characterized by a disposition (that is, a non-cognitive abil-
ities level), decides the optimal time to deal with difficulties.
More specifically at each point in time the DM might experience two states,
namely, the full capacity state and the deteriorated capacity state, with a constant
positive probability. Experiencing the full capacity state means that she enjoys
high dispositions while experiencing the deteriorated capacity state means that her
dispositions are low. Tasks are of two types, easy and difficult ones. On the one
hand, getting good economic outcomes is less likely under difficult than under easy
tasks but on the other hand, outcomes associated to difficult tasks are more valuable
than outcomes associated to easy tasks. We consider that states and economic
performance are positively related, specifically, the higher the DM’s disposition the
higher the probability of being successful when developing a task, either easy or
difficult. It is worth mentioning that no effort decision is analyzed here. As we
previously stated, the only decision of the DM is when to confront with difficulties.
We assume that once she decides to confront with them, she sticks at this decision
forever.
We also consider an extension of the model in which we analyze the role of moti-
vation. That is, we study the case in which individuals’ dispositions are sensitive to
outcome achievements. Formally, the probabilities of experiencing the full capacity
state and the deteriorated capacity state are not constant over time. We assume
that their value at a given period depends on their value and on the likelihood of
good economic outcomes in the previous period.5
Our results are as follows. We find how a low disposition DM will avoid difficulties
forever while a high disposition DM will cope with them since the beginning. Thus,
individuals with poor abilities get trapped into low value easy tasks. However, when
motivation plays a role, the achievement of good economic outcomes out of easy tasks
leaves the DM with the disposition of coping with difficulties from some point in time
on.6 In line with this finding it is worth mentioning the results of a program carried
out in West Bengal, by the indian microfinance institution Bandhan, consisting on
providing extremely poor individuals with productive assets. The authors observed
how people ended up working 28% more hours, mostly on activities not related to
the assets they were given and that their mental health had improved. The program
4See John and Srivastava (1999) for the Big Five domains of non-cognitive abilities, their traits and facets.
5In particular we assume that probabilities evolve according to a Markov process.
6This is consistent with Ali (2011), a model in which the long-run self, the planner, decides at each point in
time whether to allow the short-run self, the doer, to face a menu in which a tempting alternative is available. The
planner does so whenever the doer experiences high self-control.
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was considered to have injected a dose of motivation, that pushed people to start
new economic activities.7
Our proposal is closely related to the branch of literature that links poverty and
psychology. For instance, Dalton et al. (2014) discuss the importance of aspira-
tions failure in the perpetuation of poverty. This paper, as ours, highlights the
role of internal constraints as a source of behaviors that might preclude individuals
from getting high welfare achievements. Their research question is, however, differ-
ent from ours, whereas they focus in one particular bias we analyze non-cognitive
abilities. We also find relations with the literature of addiction and self-control.
Specifically, Bernheim and Rangel (2004) study patterns of addictive behavior of a
DM that operates in two modes, namely, cold and hot. When in the cold mode the
DM selects her most preferred alternative whereas when in the hot mode, choices
and preferences may diverge because the DM losses cognitive control. This paper
presents a theory of addiction whereas ours focuses on the effects of non-cognitive
abilities in the decision of facing onerous but valuable tasks. Also, Ozdenoren et al.
(2012) exhaustively account for the dynamics of self-control performance of a DM
that has to choose her optimal consumption path. We depart from this paper since
we focus on outcome achievement and motivation, and not on capacity exhaustion,
as the mechanism determining decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline version of the
model. In this version, the probability of experiencing the full capacity state is time
independent. Section 3 presents the extension of the model. In it, the probability
of experiencing the full capacity state is sensitive to outcome achievements. The
dynamics of its evolution is therefore outlined. In both sections, optimal strategies
and their associated utility gains are presented. Section 4 concludes. Section 5
contains technical proofs.
2 A model on avoidance behavior
Let s1 and s2 be the two states that the DM might experience. When experiencing
s2 the DM is in the full capacity state and enjoys high abilities. When experiencing
s1 the DM is in the deteriorated capacity state, meaning that she executes her
abilities poorly. At every point in time, t ∈ Z+, she has a probability q ∈ [0, 1] of
experiencing s2. Thus, she experiences s1 with probability 1 − q. Tasks are of two
types, (e)asy ones, denoted d1, and (d)ifficult ones, denoted d2.
The likelihood of getting good economic outcomes is denoted pij , with i, j = 1, 2.
7The complete article is available at http://www.economist.com/node/21554506.
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Subscript i refers to the DM’s state, that is, either s1 or s2, whereas subscript j refers
to the difficulty of the task, that is, either d1 or d2. Probabilities are as follows: first,
fixing difficulty, the likelihood of good economic outcomes increases with the DM’s
state. There is, in fact, a large amount of literature posing non-cognitive abilities
as one of the factors determining performance and outcomes, for instance, in the
domains of education and in the labor market.8 Second, fixing the DM’s state,
the likelihood of good economic outcomes decreases with task’s difficulty. Table 1
presents these probabilities. They increase as we move downward and to the right:
Table 1: Probabilities of getting good economic outcomes.
P ≡
s1 s2
d2 p12 p22
d1 p11 p21
Notice that no assumption is made about the relationship between p11 and p22.
Finally, good economic outcomes are worth just 1 unit when they are the result of
developing easy tasks and K > 1 units when they come out of developing difficult
tasks.
We make an assumption regarding the probabilities of success. It captures the
idea that individuals with low dispositions are more vulnerable than individuals with
high dispositions to the characteristics of the tasks they deal with. For high disposi-
tion individuals, task’s difficulty is less relevant than for low disposition individuals
in determining their chances of success.9 We formally express it as:
Assumption 1: p11 − p12 > p21 − p22.
The second assumption is related to the strategies among which the DM chooses:
Assumption 2: once the DM decides to face difficulties, she commits to this
decision forever.
Regarding this assumption there exists evidence showing that in many situations
individuals become locked into costly courses of action and a cycle of escalating
commitment arises. The justification of previous decisions, the necessity to comply
with norms or a desire for decision consistency in the decision making process, might
8See Heckman et al. (2006) and Balart and Cabrales (2014) for an illustration of this relationship.
9On the domain of cognitive abilities Gonzalez (2005) provides experimental evidence on how increasing task
difficulty, understood as workload, was more detrimental for individuals with low abilities.
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encourage commitment.10 The strategies available to the DM therefore comprise
choosing the point in time in which to face difficulties. We denote by (∞) the always
avoiding difficulties strategy and by (0) the facing difficulties since the beginning
strategy. A strategy consisting on facing difficulties from a point in time 0 < t <∞
on, is denoted (t).11
The DM behaves as an expected utility maximizer. She determines her optimal
path of action at the initial point in time, taking into account her disposition, that
is, the point-wise probability q of being in the full capacity state. We consider that
the DM is risk neutral. We then focus on the role of dispositions without dealing
with risk aversion issues.12 Thus, the current expected utility of developing an easy
task at time t is qp21 + (1 − q)p11 and the current expected utility of developing a
difficult task at time t is K(qp22 +(1−q)p12). Furthermore, let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the
discount factor of the stream of pay-offs. We now formally state the DM’s problem.
It is as follows:
When experiencing the full capacity state, s2, with probability q, the DM decides,
at t = 0, the point in time t to face difficult tasks, in order to maximize her long-run
expected utility. Specifically, she solves:
Max
t
u((t)) = Max
t
t−1∑
i=0
δi(qp21 + (1− q)p11) +K
∞∑
i=t
δi(qp22 + (1− q)p12)
2.1 Results
It seems intuitive that individuals who enjoy better dispositions perform tasks better.
In fact, it is common that people tend to avoid difficulties when they do not feel
prepared to face them. Results in this section capture this idea. When the DM
experiences the full capacity state with high enough probability, she will opt for
difficulties since the beginning. In contrast, when the probability of experiencing
the full capacity state is low enough, she will prefer to avoid them forever.
We build results in Theorem 1 by means of a function λ : [0, 1]4×R −→ R, that
depends on the primitives of the model, defining the environment in which the DM
maker her decision, namely, the probabilities of good economic outcomes and their
value. It defines a domination threshold between the strategy of facing difficulties
10See Staw (1981) for the concept of Escalation of Commitment. See also Arkes and Blumer (1985) and Thaler
(1980) for a justification of this phenomenon based on the sunk cost effect.
11It is worth to stress how the explicit introduction of time does not aim to describe the evolution of abilities
along the life cycle. Time only captures that, at each point in time, the DM develops a task.
12See Tanaka et al. (2010) for a paper studying the relationship between poverty and risk and time preferences.
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since the beginning and the strategy of postponing them for one period, that is,
between (0) and (1).13 For values of q higher or equal than this threshold, (0) is
preferred to (1) and for values of q smaller than it, (1) is preferred to (0). This
information is enough to identify the optimal strategy.
Before stating the result it is worth highlighting that whenever outcomes out
of difficult tasks do (respectively do not) compensate the decrease in probability
of successfully dealing with them, that is, whenever p11/p12 ≤ K (respectively
K ≤ p21/p22), the DM finds optimal to always face (respectively to always avoid)
difficulties, even if q = 0 (respectively q = 1). We then focus on the interesting case
in which p21/p22 < K < p11/p12. Theorem 1 is as follows:
Theorem 1. The DM’s optimal strategy is to face difficulties since the beginning
whenever she enjoys the full capacity state with high enough probability (that is,
whenever λ ≤ q) and to always avoid them whenever she experiences the full capacity
state with low enough probability (that is, whenever q < λ).
Notice that optimal paths of action are characterized by extreme behaviors. Fac-
ing difficulties from an intermediate point in time is never optimal. Furthermore,
assumption 2 does not impose any restriction in this case, that is, going back from
difficult to easy tasks is never considered. Notice also that if for the DM never
(respectively always) postponing difficulties is the best thing to do, this will also be
the case for other DM characterized by a higher (respectively by a lower) disposi-
tion (that is, a lower q). We interpret the always avoiding difficulties strategy as
procrastination on onerous tasks.14
The following example aims to clarify the elements of the model and the first
result:
Example. Consider a DM who is deciding which type of job to look for or to
accept. Jobs are of two types, easy or routine jobs, that give the DM a payoff
(wage) of 1, and high responsibility jobs with payoff of K = 1.3. The probabilities
of properly dealing with either job are higher when the DM is in the full capacity
state than when she is in the deteriorated capacity state, specifically:
s1 s2
d2 0.5 0.7
d1 0.7 0.8
13Specifically, λ =
Kp12 − p11
(p21 − p11)−K(p22 − p12)
. It relates the long-run expected utility of (0) versus (1) under the
deteriorated capacity state, that is, when q = 0 and the long-run expected utility of (0) versus (1), under the full
capacity state, that is, when q = 1. See the proof of Theorem 1.
14See O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008) for two references on procrastination.
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In this case λ = 0.31. Thus if the DM is of low enough disposition (that is,
if q < 0.31), she will find optimal to always postpone the acceptance of the high
responsibility job, whereas if she is of high enough disposition (that is, if q ≥ 0.31),
she will find optimal to deal with the high responsibility job since the beginning.
We plot below the ranking of long-run expected utilities under the strategies the
DM chooses among. The left figure illustrates the case in which always avoiding
difficulties is optimal whereas the right figure illustrates the case in which facing
them since the beginning is optimal:
Figure 1: (∞) is the optimal strategy Figure 2: (0) is the optimal strategy
-
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The following remark discusses the comparative statics on the primitives of the
model, that define the environment in which the DM performs, namely, the proba-
bilities of success and the value of good economic outcomes under difficult tasks:
Remark. The threshold λ is decreasing in p22 and p12, increasing in p21 and p11,
and decreasing in K.
Higher chances of successfully developing either easy or difficult tasks make the
DM more prone to choose each of them. In the same vein, an increase in the value
of good economic outcomes out of difficult tasks incentivizes the DM to face them.
An increase in K directly raises the utility of facing difficult tasks. This happens
despite of the fact that the probability of achieving good economic outcomes in these
circumstances is systematically lower. Theorem 1 and this remark are summarized
as follows:
Corollary 1. The range of probabilities [q, 1] such that the DM’s optimal strategy
is to face difficulties since the beginning increases (respectively decreases) with the
probability of success under difficult (respectively easy) tasks. It also increases with
the value of economic outcomes out of difficult tasks.
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We also describe utility gains under the aforementioned optimal strategies and
analyze the effect of a marginal boost in dispositions. We assume that a marginal
increase in dispositions, does not affect the originally optimal strategy. Proposition
1 is as follows:
Proposition 1. The long-run expected utility of any optimal strategy is monoton-
ically increasing and linear q. Its value is
K(qp22 + (1− q)p12)
1− δ whenever (0) is
optimal and
qp21 + (1− q)p11
1− δ whenever (∞) is optimal. Moreover, the marginal
return of an increase in q is higher when q ≥ λ than when q < λ.
A marginal increase in the DM’s disposition, increases the utility of any path
of action and in particular, of the optimal one. Moreover, the higher the DM’s
disposition the higher this marginal return. The following figure illustrates the
statement. The horizontal axis represents the probability of experiencing the full
capacity state and the vertical axis represents the long-run expected utility of the
optimal strategies, either (∞) or (0), according to this probability:
Figure 3: utility as a function of q, with K ′ > K
-
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Observe how the threshold λ, which decreases with K, generates a kink, making
utility convex (specifically, piece-wise linear) in q.
To conclude this section, it is worth mentioning the possibility of carrying out a
welfare assessment analysis. The intuition is as follows: consider two individuals.
One of them, the disadvantaged individual, has low abilities and always avoids
difficulties, the other, the advantaged individual, has high abilities and always faces
difficulties. It turns out that the marginal return of boosting abilities is higher for the
advantaged individual than for the disadvantaged individual. Suppose that a social
planner has one unit of resources, devoted to improve abilities. If it is the case that
the planner only cares about maximizing total returns, he might allocate this unit
on the advantaged individual. If he also has equity concerns, he will have to take
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into account that the utility gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged
individual will exacerbate. In this case, the planner might be willing to allocate
resources on the disadvantaged individual.
3 The role of motivation
In this section we analyze how success and failure might affect the manifestation of
non-cognitive abilities, for instance, self-esteem, self-confidence or perseverance.15
We assume that the probability of experiencing the full capacity state varies over
time according to a Markovian process. This modeling aims to capture the idea that
success may boost the manifestation of the non-cognitive abilities while failure may
deteriorate them. Formally, the probability of experiencing the full capacity state
at t, depends on its value at t− 1, and on the probability of getting good economic
outcome in that period. Let q(t) ∈ [0, 1] denote this probability. Thus, 1 − q(t)
denotes the probability of experiencing the deteriorated capacity state at t. Let
the probabilities of getting good outcomes be the ones in the previous section. The
following expression accounts for the evolution of the probabilities of experiencing
either state:
[q(t−1) 1− q(t−1)]
[
p2j 1− p2j
p1j 1− p1j
]
= [q(t) 1− q(t)] (1)
where j = {1, 2} accounts for task’s difficulty.16 Consider that the DM experi-
ences s2 at t− 1 with probability q(t−1). Then, at t she will experience s2 with the
probability with which she was successful in the previous period. This is captured
by the first column in the matrix above. Similarly, at t she will experience s1 with
the probability with which she failed in the previous period. This is captured by
the second column the matrix above. Let denote q(0), the DM’s initial probability
of experiencing the full capacity state. The current expected utility of developing
an easy task at time t is q(t)p21 + (1 − q(t))p11 and the current expected utility of
developing a difficult task at time t is K(q(t)p22 + (1− q(t))p12).
Notice that, as a consequence of q(t) evolving according to a Markovian process,
15As Mruk (2006) points out, the demands of life are not constant, so self-esteem levels will fluctuate depending on
what is happening in a persons life. Redundancy, bereavement, illness, studying, gaining a qualification, parenthood,
poverty, being a victim of crime, divorce, promotion at work will all have an impact on our self-esteem levels. Self-
esteem levels go up and down and can change over time. Also, as Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) point out, motivation
helps individuals to persevere in the presence of setbacks.
16Notice that q(t) depends on the chosen strategy. If the DM decides to face difficult tasks from a point in time
t∗ = 5 on, q(4) is the resulting probability of having opted for easy tasks for four periods. If the DM decides to
face difficult tasks from t∗ = 3 on, q(4) is the resulting probability of having faced easy tasks for two periods and
difficult ones from the third period on.
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two stationary probabilities arise. These are, the one related to always facing easy
tasks, denoted qe, and the one related to always facing difficult tasks, denoted qd. We
interpret them as the average long-run frequencies with which the DM experiences
the full capacity state when she always faces easy or difficult tasks, respectively.
Since the likelihood of success is higher in easy tasks, we have that qe > qd.17 The
DM’s problem is as follows:
When experiencing the full capacity state, s2, with probability q
(0), she decides, at
t = 0, the point in time t, to face difficult tasks, in order to maximize her long-run
expected utility. Formally, she solves:
Max
t
u((t)) = Max
t
t−1∑
i=0
δi(q(i)p21 + (1− q(i))p11) +K
∞∑
i=t
δi(q(i)p22 + (1− q(i))p12)
Results are summarized in the following section.
3.1 Results
Theorem 2 summarizes optimal strategies. As in the previous section our analysis
relies on a function µ : [0, 1]4 × R −→ R, that depends on K and P .18 It defines
a domination threshold between strategy the strategy of facing difficulties since the
beginning and the strategy of postponing them for one period, that is, between (0)
and (1). For values of q(0) higher or equal than this threshold, (0) is preferred to (1)
and for values of q(0) smaller than it, (1) is preferred to (0). This threshold, together
with the stationary probabilities, determine the chosen strategy. In the following
result we focus on the case in which assumption 2 does not play a role, that is, the
case in which DM’s optimal strategy is, in fact, within the class of strategies pre-
scribed by assumption 2. We comment on the remaining cases afterwards. Theorem
2 is as follows:
Theorem 2. The DM’s optimal strategy is to face difficulties since the beginning
whenever she always enjoys the full capacity state with high enough probability (that
is, whenever µ ≤ qd < qe, q(0)), to always avoid them whenever she always experi-
ences the full capacity state with low enough probability (that is, whenever q(0), qd <
qe ≤ µ) and to face them from an intermediate point in time whenever she gets
17Let Tk, with k = e, d, denote the transition matrices out of always facing either easy or difficult tasks, re-
spectively. In getting qe and qd we solve [qk, 1 − qk]Tk = [qk, 1 − qk]. The determinants of the transition ma-
trices are denoted T d = p22 − p12 and T e = p21 − p11 for difficult and easy tasks, respectively. We have that
qd = (p12)(1−T d)−1 and qe = (p11)(1−T e)−1. Suppose that qe < qd. This implies that p11(1−T d) < p12(1−T e)
or p11(1− p22) < p12(1− p21) which cannot hold since p11 > p12 and (1− p22) > (1− p21). Thus qe > qd holds.
18The interpretation of µ is parallel to the one of λ.
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motivated through outcome achievements associated to easy tasks (that is, whenever
q(0) < µ ≤ qd < qe).
In contrast with results in the previous section, jumping into difficult tasks at
some point in time can be optimal here. We interpret this strategy as one in which
the DM prefers to first deal with easy tasks, because performing properly motivates
her to deal with difficult but more rewarding tasks. The figure below plots the
ranking of utilities in this case. The DM exhibits single-peaked preferences on the
optimal time to face difficulties, with the peak corresponding to the aforementioned
intermediate strategy:
Figure 4: (t) is the optimal strategy
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The question of when to do the hard stuff arised in Quora, an internet knowledge
market, in which people discuss about a specific given topic. The topic was: Is it
better to do easy tasks first and then move on to harder ones, or vice versa?.19 One
of the answers, that accurately illustrate our statement, was:
“Important is to evaluate, which are the harder tasks and which the easy tasks.
Out of this it becomes clear, how long it will take to do them. (...) The rest has
more psychological character and is strongly depending on the personality. I per-
sonally like to mix it. This gives the success feeling, if you do the easy tasks and
motivates, to continue with the harder tasks, to make the overall project the success.”
If individuals indeed behave this way, there will be chances of improving indi-
vidual achievements that have to do with motivation. A model of human capital
19See http://www.quora.com/Is-it-better-to-do-easy-tasks-first-and-then-move-on-to-harder-ones-or-vice-versa.
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accumulation in which individuals build their skills by developing easy tasks up to
the point that it is optimal for them to face difficulties, might offer the same type
of results. However we truly think that the human capital accumulation story is
essentially different from the motivation story. This difference relies on the follow-
ing reasoning: while individuals build their human capital in the actual process of
developing a task, motivation results when outcomes are achieved. We think that
this is a crucial distinction, that would posse different policy implications.
It is also worth mentioning that if qd = q(0) when facing difficulties since the
beginning is optimal or qe = q(0) when always avoiding them is optimal, we are back
to the optimal behavior in the previous section. Notice that the DM enjoys the full
capacity state with the average long-run frequencies qd and qe, respectively.
We now briefly comment on some cases in which assumption 2 plays a role.
That is, the DM has to choose the optimal strategy among the class of strategies
prescribed by assumption 2, regardless of whether other path of action would have
delivered higher utility. Under qd < qe < µ ≤ q(0) the DM would have preferred
to switch to easy tasks after have been dealing with difficulties for a while. Within
the class of strategies she can choose among due to assumption 2, the DM exhibits
single deep preferences on the optimal time to face difficulties. The deep corresponds
to an intermediate strategy and the peaks correspond to the extreme strategies or
either never dealing with difficulties or facing them since the beginning. In this
case, either of the two is chosen. The same happens under qd < µ ≤ qe, q(0). Among
the available strategies prescribed by assumption 2, the DM ends up dealing with
difficulties since the beginning. Finally under q(0), qd ≤ µ < qe the DM would have
also preferred to switch to easy tasks after have been dealing with difficulties for a
while. As a result of assumption 2, the DM ends up performing an intermediate
strategy.20
The following result deals with the properties of the utility gains under the three
types of optimal strategies. It also describes the returns of a boost in the DM’s initial
disposition, i.e., q(0). We assume that a marginal increase in the initial disposition,
does not affect the originally optimal strategy. Specifically, for the case in which
an intermediate strategy is optimal we consider that marginal increase in the initial
disposition, does not affect the particular point in time to face difficulties.21 Before
stating the results let us denote by mr((.)), the marginal return of a increase in the
DM’s initial disposition, under any optimal strategy. Proposition 2 is as follows:
Proposition 2. The long-run expected utility is monotonically increasing and linear
20See the proof of Theorem 2.
21Formally, t|q(0) = t|q(0)+.
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in q(0) under any optimal strategy. Moreover, mr((0)) > mr((t − 1)) > mr((t)) >
mr((∞)).
Results in Proposition 2, as the ones in Proposition 1, capture the idea that
individuals with better abilities perform better and achieve higher utility. It is also
the case that advantaged individuals, those with high q(0), benefit more from a
marginal increase in their abilities. As the table below illustrates, as q(0) increases
within a row, everything else equal, that is, as the DM is of higher initial dispositions,
she moves from finding (∞) or (t) optimal to finding (0) optimal.
Furthermore, figure 3 in the previous section illustrated how the utility of high
disposition individuals that always confront with difficulties, is higher than the util-
ity of low disposition individuals that always avoid difficulties. We also carry such
an analysis in this framework. For this purpose we make use of the table below.
In it we list the three combinations in which µ, qe and qd may appear. Within
each combination we consider that µ, qe and qd remain unaltered. However, they
might be different across combinations. For the ease of exposition we only consider
strict inequalities. Thus, within each combination we present the four alternatives in
which q(0) relates with the previous values.22 We also present the optimal strategies
in each of the combinations. Table 2 is as follows:
Table 2: Optimal strategies
Case (i) q(0) < qd < qe < µ qd < q(0) < qe < µ qd < qe < q(0) < µ qd < qe < µ < q(0)
(∞) (∞) (∞) (0) or (∞)
Case (ii) q(0) < µ < qd < qe µ < q(0) < qd < qe µ < qd < q(0) < qe µ < qd < qe < q(0)
(t) (0) (0) (0)
Case (iii) q(0) < qd < µ < qe qd < q(0) < µ < qe qd < µ < q(0) < qe qd < µ < qe < q(0)
(t) (t) (0) (0)
Let us focus on optimal strategies in the row corresponding to case (ii), that is,
either (t) or (0). In this case assumption 2 does not play a role. This allow us to
make neat analysis. Recall that q(0) increases as we move from left to right within
a row. We can then make direct comparison of the utility gains under these two
optimal strategies. The following lemma summarizes the findings. It is as follows:
Lemma 1. Consider a DM characterized by q(0). The optimal strategy of facing
difficulties since the beginning (that is, whenever µ < q(0), qd < qe) yields higher
utility than the optimal strategy of facing them from an intermediate point in time
(that is, whenever q(0) < µ < qd < qe).
22For the complete analysis, see the proof of Theorem 2
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Also, in order to make the intermediate strategy (t) in case (ii) and the always
avoiding strategy (∞) in case (i) comparable, we consider, for the latter, the specific
situation in which q(0) < qd < qe < µ. Notice that this is the only situation in case
(i) in which q(0) < qd. Let q(0) be the same in both scenarios. Let us also focus
on the case in which the only difference between case (i) and case (ii) is that we
increase µ, from case (ii) to case (i), by decreasing K.23 Since qe and qd do not
depend on K, they remain unaltered. Lemma 2 is as follows:
Lemma 2. Consider a DM characterized by q(0). The optimal strategy of facing
difficulties from an intermediate point in time (that is, whenever q(0) < µ < qd < qe)
yields higher utility than the optimal strategy of always avoiding difficulties (that is,
whenever q(0) < qd < qe < µ).
With these two lemmas we conclude that optimal strategies involving the choice
of difficulties at some point in time, yield higher utility than optimal strategies in
which individuals avoid difficulties forever.24
4 Conclusions
Non-cognitive abilities have an impact in determining performance in dimensions of
huge economic relevance, as labor market entry or search decisions or educational
attainments. We link, in a dynamic setting, non-cognitive abilities to the decision
of when to deal with difficult but valuable tasks. We show how low disposition indi-
viduals always avoid difficulties and forego better economic opportunities while high
disposition individuals are willing to deal with difficulties. The behavior of individ-
uals that always avoid dealing with onerous tasks resembles procrastination results,
without relying on the hyperbolic discounting assumption.25 Also, individuals that
get motivated by outcome achievements find optimal to jump into difficult tasks at
some point in time.
5 Appendix
Before proceeding we set some useful definitions. Let us denote by u1,(0) and u2,(0),
the DM’s long-run expected utility when she only experiences the deteriorated ca-
23See the proof of Theorem 2, step 1.
24Also consider the optimal intermediate strategy (t) associated to q(0), as described in case (ii) in table 2.
Consider a DM with initial disposition q(0)
′
> q(0) such that her optimal strategy is (t− 1) (as q(t)′ > q(t) for every
t, the DM with initial disposition q(0)
′
will reach µ before than the DM with initial disposition q(0). See Claim 2
and the proof of Theorem 2). Then, u((t− 1)) > u((t)) for the DM characterized by q(0)′ . As utility increases with
dispositions, then u((t)) for the DM with initial disposition q(0)
′
has to be also higher than u((t)) for the DM with
initial disposition q(0).
25See Rubinstein (2003) for a discussion on this assumption.
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pacity state s1, that is when q = 0, and when she only experiences the full capacity
state s2, that is when q = 1, respectively, under strategy (0). Similarly, let us denote
by u1,(1) and u2,(1), the DM’s long-run expected utility when she only experiences
the deteriorated capacity state s1, that is when q = 0, and when she only experiences
the full capacity state s2, that is when q = 1, respectively, under strategy (1).
Let us define functions f : R→ R and g : R→ R as f(λ) = λu2,(1)+(1−λ)u1,(1)
and g(λ) = λu2,(0) +(1−λ)u1,(0), respectively. For λ ∈ [0, 1], these functions are the
convex combination of the DM’s long-run expected utilities, when she experiences
s2 with probability q = 1 and q = 0, out of strategies (1) and (0), respectively.
Furthermore, we say that a strategy (t) dominates strategy (t + 1) whenever the
long-run expected utility of (t) is higher than the one of (t + 1). Let (t) > (t + 1)
denote this domination relationship. Recall that (t) denotes any strategy such that
0 < t < ∞. We also say that strategy (0) dominates strategy (1) whenever the
long-run expected utility of (0) is higher than the one of (1). Let (0) > (1) denote
this domination relationship.
5.1 Proofs of section 2
Proof of Theorem 1. It is composed by two steps. In Step 1 we derive the threshold
λ such f(λ) and g(λ) equalize. For such a λ, (1) and (0) yield the same long-run
expected utility. For values higher or equal than λ then (0) > (1). For values lower
than λ then (1) > (0). In step 2 we argue how this information is enough to set the
optimal strategy, depending on the values of λ and q.
Step 1. If the DM experiences s2 with probability q = 1, the long-run expected
utility of strategy (0) is u2,(0) = Kp22+δu
2,(0). If she experiences s1 with probability
1 − q = 1, the long-run expected utility of strategy (0) is u1,(0) = Kp12 + δu1,(0).
Similarly, when she experiences s2 with probability q = 1, the long-run expected
utility of strategy (1) is u2,(1) = p21 + δu
2,(0) whereas when she experiences s1 with
probability 1− q = 1, then u1,(1) = p11 + δu1,(0). From previous definitions, f(λ) =
λ(u2,(1)−u1,(1))+u1,(1) and g(λ) = λ(u2,(0)−u1,(0))+u1,(0). Solving f(λ) = g(λ) we
get λ((u2,(1)−u1,(1))− (u2,(0)−u1,(0))) = u1,(0)−u1,(1). Notice that u2,(0)−u1,(0) =
K(p22 − p12)
1− δ and u
1,(0) =
Kp12
1− δ . Thus, λ((p21−p121)−K(p22−p12)) = Kp12−p11
or λ =
Kp12 − p11
(p21 − p11)−K(p22 − p12) . Assumption 1 implies that p22−p12 > p21−p11.
Thus the denominator of λ is always different from zero, meaning that λ is a real
number. Since by assumption 1, the denominator is negative, for values lower than
λ then (1) > (0) and for values higher than it, (0) > (1). For values equal to λ we
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assume that (0) > (1) as well. Assumption 1 also implies that p11/p12 > p21/p22.
26
Thus, ∂λ/∂K =
p21p12 − p22p11
((p21 − p11)−K(p22 − p12))2 < 0. When K =
p21
p22
then λ = 1
and when K =
p11
p12
then λ = 0. Thus, when K <
p21
p22
then λ > 1, and no matter q,
(1) > (0). On the contrary, when K >
p11
p12
then λ < 0, and no matter q, (0) > (1).
We focus on the interesting case such that
p11
p12
< K <
p11
p12
and λ ∈ (0, 1). We
conclude that when q ≥ λ then (0) > (1) and when q < λ then (1) > (0).
Step 2. We set here optimal strategies. Two cases arise depending on the position
of q relative to λ.
(i) Consider that q ≥ λ. By step 1, (0) > (1). Compare now any pair of strate-
gies (t) and (t + 1). We have that u((t)) =
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(qp21 + (1 − q)p11) +
K
∑∞
i=t δ
i(qp22 + (1 − q)p12) and u((t + 1)) =
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(qp21 + (1 − q)p11) +
δt(qp21 + (1 − q)p11) + K
∑∞
i=t+1 δ
i(qp22 + (1 − q)p12). Up to t − 1, (t)
and (t + 1) yield the same utility. From time t on the comparison is be-
tween (0) and (1) evaluated from the point of view of time t. Since for
every t, q ≥ λ, by step 1, it follows that (t) > (t + 1) for every t. It is
useful to observe that limi−→∞ u((t + i)) = u((∞)). We then conclude that
(0) > (1) > ... > (t) > (t+ 1) > ... > (∞) holds.
(ii) Consider that q < λ. We use a similar reasoning as above, and thus omit it
here, to conclude that (∞) > ... > (t + 1) > (t) > ... > (1) > (0). In this case
(∞) is optimal.
The result is then established.

Proof of the Remark. See the proof of Theorem 1 for the relation between λ and
K. We analyze here how λ varies with the probabilities of success. We omit the
denominator in the subsequent derivatives since it it always positive.27 We have
that: ∂λ/∂p11 = Kp22 − p21, ∂λ/∂p12 = K(p21 − Kp22), ∂λ/∂p21 = p11 − Kp12
and ∂λ/∂p22 = K(Kp12 − p11). Since K ∈ (p21/p22, p11/p12) then ∂λ/∂pi1 > 0 and
∂λ/∂pi2 < 0 with i = 1, 2. The result is then established.

Proof of Proposition 1. Notice that u((0)) = K
∑∞
i=0 δ
i(qp22+(1−q)p12) = (K(qp22+
(1− q)p12)(1− δ)−1. Similarly u((∞)) =
∑∞
i=0 δ
i(qp21 + (1− q)p11) = (qp21 + (1−
26By assumption 1, p11 − p12 > p21 − p22 This implies that p11 − p12
p12
>
p21 − p22
p22
or equivalently p11/p12 >
p21/p22.
27Its value is (p21 − p11 −K(p22 − p12))2.
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q)p11)(1− δ)−1. Since ∂u((0))/∂q = K(p22 − p12)(1− δ)−1 > 0 and ∂u((∞))/∂q =
(p21− p11)(1− δ)−1 > 0, utilities are increasing and linear in q. Finally, assumption
1 implies that p22 − p12 > p21 − p11, then the marginal return of an increase in q is
higher under (0) than under (∞). The result is then established. 
5.2 Proofs of section 3
Before the proof of Theorem 2 let us set two useful claims.
Claim 1. For every t, q(0) > q(t) > q(t+1) > qe whenever q(0) > qe and q(0) < q(t) <
q(t+1) < qe whenever q(0) < qe.
Proof of Claim 1. The proof of Claim 1 is by induction. We focus on the case in
which q(0) > qe. We prove that for t = 1, q(0) > q(1) > qe holds. We set the
induction part afterwards.
Step 1. We prove that q(0) > q(1) > qe. In showing that q(0) > q(1), we compare
the initial probability of s2, with its first perturbation, after having decided to face
an easy task. Consider expression (1) in the main body:
[q(0) 1− q(0)]
[
p21 1− p21
p11 1− p11
]
= [q(1) 1− q(1)]
we have that q(1) = q(0)p21 + (1 − q(0))p11. Since q(0) > qe, replacing qe by its
value we have that q(0) >
p11
1− p21 + p11 or equivalently q
(0)(1 − p21 + p11) > p11.
This expression becomes q(0) > q(0)p21 + (1− q(0))p11. The RHS of this expression
is exactly q(1). In showing that q(1) > qe we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that
q(0) > qe and q(1) < qe holds. We have that q(0)p21 + (1 − q(0))p11 < qe. This is
equivalent to q(0)p21+(1−q(0))p11 < p11
1− p21 + p11 or (p11+q
(0)(p21−p11))(1−p21+
p11) < p11. Rearranging terms it becomes p11 − p11(p21 − p11) + q(0)(p21 − p11)(1−
p21 + p11) < p11. This is equivalent to q
(0) <
p11
1− p21 + p11 = q
e, contradicting our
initial assumption. Thus, q(0) > q(1) > qe holds.
Step 2. If for an arbitrary t, q(t) > q(t+1) > qe holds, for q(t+1) we have:
[
q(t+1) 1− q(t+1)
][p21 1− p21
p11 1− p11
]
= [q(t+2) 1− q(t+2)].
Following the same reasoning than in the first step we conclude that q(t+1) >
q(t+2) > qe. We conclude that q(0) > q(t) > q(t+1) > ... > qe holds. The result is
then established.
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The case in which q(0) < qe relies on the same argument. The same analysis goes
through for describing the relation between q(t) and qd.. We thus omit these proofs
here. 
Claim 2. q(i) = q(0)(T k)i + p1k
∑i−1
j=0(T
k)j with k = e, d.
Proof of Claim 2. Recall that T d = p22−p12 and T e = p21−p11. By expression (1) in
the main body, q1 = q(0)T k+p1k. Also q
2 = q(1)T k+p1k = (q
(0)T k+p1k)T
k+p1k =
q(0)(T k)2 + p1kT
k + p1k. In general q
(i) = q(0)(T k)i + p1k(T
k)i−1 + ... + p1kT k +
p1k or q
(i) = q(0)(T k)i + p11
∑t−1
j=0(T
k)j . To conclude that q(t+i) = q(0)(T k)i +
p1k
∑i−1
j=0(T
k)j we follow a similar reasoning. We therefore omit it here. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We follow the same steps than in the proof of Theorem 1.
Step 1. Consider expression (1) in the main body. When the DM experi-
ences s2 with probability q
(0) = 1, the long-run expected utility out of strat-
egy (0) is u2,(0) = Kp22 + δ(p22u
2,(0) + (1 − p22)u1,(0)). When she experiences
s1 with probability 1 − q(0) = 1, the long-run expected utility of strategy (0) is
u1,(0) = Kp12 + δ(p12u
2,(0) + (1 − p12)u1,(0)). Solving for u1,(0) and u2,(0) we get
u2,(0) =
K(p22 − δT d)
(1− δ)(1− δT d) and that u
1,(0) =
Kp12
(1− δ)(1− δT d) . Thus, u
2,(0)−u1,(0) =
KT d
1− δT d . When she experiences s2 with probability q
(0) = 1, the long-run ex-
pected utility out of strategy (1) is u2,(1) = p21 + δ(p21u
2,(0) + (1 − p21)u1,(0)).
Similarly, when she experiences s1, with probability 1 − q(0) = 1, the long-run ex-
pected utility out of strategy (1) can is u1,(1) = p11 + δ(p11u
2,(0) + (1 − p11)u1,(0)).
Now, f(µ) = µ(u2,(1) − u1,(1)) + u1,(1) and g(µ) = µ(u2,(0) − u1,(0)) + u1,(0) Solving
f(µ) = g(µ) we get µ =
u1,(0) − u1,(1)
(u2,(1) − u1,(1))− (u2,(0) − u1,(0)) . With respect to the nu-
merator, u1,(0)−u1,(1) = (1−δ)u1,(0)−p11−δp11(u2,(0)−u1,(0)) or equivalently u1,(0)−
u1,(1) =
(1− δ)Kp12
(1− δ)(1− δT d) − p11 −
δp11KT
d
1− δT d =
K(p12 − δp11T d)− (p11 − δp11T d)
1− δT d .
Regarding the denominator, u2,(1) − u1,(1) = T e + δT e(u2,(0) − u1,(0)) and u2,(1) −
u1,(1) − (u2,(0) − u1,(0)) = T e − (1 − δT e)(u2,(0) − u1,(0)). This is equivalent to
T e(1− δT d)−KT d(1− δT e)
(1− δT d) . Thus, µ =
K(p12 − δp11T d)− (p11 − δp11T d)
T e(1− δT d)−KT d(1− δT e) .
28 Since
by assumption 1, T d > T e the denominator is different from zero, hence µ is
a real number. Since by assumption 1, the denominator is negative, for values
lower than µ then (1) > (0) and for values higher it, (0) > (1). For values
28When the DM does not care about the future, that is, when δ = 0, λ = µ. That q does not vary over time is
conceptually equivalent to think about a DM making one period decisions without consequences on her subsequent
states. Additionally, ∂µ/∂δ = K(K − 1)(p11p22 − p21p22) > 0, meaning that the more the DM cares about the
future the more she postpones difficult tasks, where good outcomes are less frequent.
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equal to µ we assume that (0) > (1) as well. Also by assumption 1, ∂µ/∂K =
(1− δT d)(p21p12 − p11p22)
(T e(1− δT d)−KT d(1− δT e))2 < 0. Furthermore, when K =
p11 − δp11T d
p12 − δp11T d then
µ = 0 and whenK =
p21 − δp21T d
p22 − δp21T d then µ = 1. Then,
p21 − δp21T d
p22 − δp21T d <
p11 − δp11T d
p12 − δp11T d .
Furthermore, when K >
p11 − δp11T d
p12 − δp11T d , then µ < 0 and (0) > (1) no matter q
(0) and
when K <
p21 − δp21T d
p22 − δp21T d , then µ > 1 and (1) > (0) no matter q
(0). The interesting
case is such that K ∈
(
p21 − δp21T d
p22 − δp21T d ,
p11 − δp11T d
p12 − p11δT d
)
and µ ∈ (0, 1). We conclude
that when q(0) ≥ µ then (0) > (1) and when q(0) < µ then (1) > (0).
Step 2. We identify here optimal strategies.
Consider that µ ≤ q(0). By step 1, (0) > (1) from the point of view of q(0). Three
cases arise:
(i) Suppose that µ ≤ qd < qe, q(0). Let us compare any pair (t) and (t + 1). We
evaluate u((t)) =
∑t−1
i=0(q
(i)p21+(1−q(i))p11)+K
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)p22+(1−q(i))p12)
versus u((t+ 1)) =
∑t−1
i=0(q
(i)p21 + (1− q(i))p11) + δt(q(t)p21 + (1− q(t))p11) +
K
∑∞
i=t+1 δ
i(q(i)p22+(1−q(i))p12). Up to t−1 both expressions yield the same
utility. From time t on, the comparison is between (0) and (1), from the point
of view of q(t). Notice that q(t) is the result of have been dealing with easy tasks
up to period t − 1. Thus, by Claim 1, q(t) is higher than µ. This implies, by
step 1, that from the point of view of q(t), (0) > (1). As a consequence, for any
pair of strategies, (t) > (t+ 1). Recall that limi−→∞ u((t+ i)) = u((∞)). This
observation applies to the remaining cases, hence we omit it in subsequents
proofs. We then establish that (0) > (1)... > (t) > (t+ 1) > ... > (∞).
Notice that assumption 2 does not play any role in case (i), that is, the DM
optimal strategy is within the class of strategies that it prescribes. However,
assumption 1 plays a role in cases (ii) and (iii) below. In both cases the DM
would have find optimal to start with difficult tasks and to switch to easy
ones when q(t) crosses µ. We look for the optimal strategies within the ones
prescribed by assumption 2.
(ii) Suppose that qd < µ ≤ qe, q(0). Let us compare (t) and (t + 1) as above.
We then evaluate u((t)) and u((t + 1)) as defined in case (i). The relevant
comparison is between (0) and (1) from the point of view of q(t). Notice that q(t)
is the result of have been dealing with easy tasks up to period t−1. By Claim 1,
every q(t) is higher than µ. Thus, from the point of view of q(t), (0) > (1) and,
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as a consequence, (t) > (t+1). Then, (0) > (1) > ... > (t) > (t+1) > ... > (∞)
and, by the same reasoning as above, (0) is optimal.29
(iii) Suppose that qd < qe ≤ µ ≤ q(0). As above, the analysis relies on comparing
intermediate strategies in which the DM first deals with easy tasks. By Claim
1, for some strategies (t), there will exist a point in time such that q(t) will
exceed µ while approaching qe. Let t∗ − 1 denote the last point in time such
that q(t
∗−1) ≥ µ. Consider points in time t ≤ t∗ − 1 and compare (t) and
(t+ 1). That is, let us evaluate u((t)) and u((t+ 1)) as defined in case (i). As
above, the relevant comparison is between (0) and (1) from the point of view
of q(t). Since t ≤ t∗ − 1, by Claim 1, q(t) ≥ µ. Thus, from the point of view
of q(t), (0) > (1) and, as a consequence, for every t ≤ t∗ − 1, (t) > (t + 1).
In particular, (t∗ − 1) > (t∗). Let us compare now u((t∗)) and u((t∗ + 1)).
Notice that, q(t
∗) < µ. Thus, from the point of view of q(t
∗), (0) < (1) and,
as a consequence, (t∗ + 1) > (t∗). By Claim 1, q(t) < µ for every t ≥ t∗. In
this case for any pair of strategies, (t + 1) > (t). Summing up we have that
(0) > (1) > ... > (t∗ − 1) > (t∗) < (t∗ + 1) < ... < (∞). The optimal strategy
might be either (0) or (∞).30
Consider that q(0) < µ. By step 1, (1) > (0) from the point of view of q(0). Three
cases arise:
(i) Suppose that q(0), qd < qe ≤ µ. Let us compare any pair (t) and (t + 1). We
evaluate u((t)) and u((t + 1)) as defined in case (i) above. Up to t − 1 both
expression yield the same utility. From t on the comparison is between (0) and
(1), from the point of view of q(t) which is the result of have been dealing with
easy tasks up to period t − 1. Thus, by Claim 1, q(t) < µ. This implies, by
step 1, that (1) > (0) from the point of view of q(t). As a consequence, for any
pair of strategies, (t + 1) > (t). Thus, (0) < (1)... < (t) < (t + 1) < ... < (∞)
and (∞) is optimal.
Similar arguments are used in the remaining cases. We go briefly over them.
(ii) Suppose that q(0) < µ ≤ qd < qe. By Claim 1 and by the same argument as in
case (iii) above, there exists a last point in time t∗−1 such that q(t∗−1) < µ. The
comparison between any pair of strategies (t) and (t + 1) relies on comparing
29In the particular case in which qe = µ = q(0), when evaluating (t) versus (t + 1) the relevant comparison is
between (0) and (1) from the point of view of q(t). But q(t) remains equal to qe because is the result of developing
easy tasks for t − 1 periods. We assume that when µ = q(t) then (0) > (1) and we maintain this assumption all
along the proof. Thus, (t) > (t+ 1). In this case (0) is optimal.
30See case (ii) for the situation in which qe = µ = q(0).
21
(0) and (1) from the point of view of q(t). Consider points in time such that
t ≤ t∗− 1. By Claim 1, q(t) < µ and thus (1) > (0) from its point of view. We
then have that (t+1) > (t) and in particular that (t∗) > (t∗−1). In contrast, at
time t ≥ t∗ then q(t) ≥ µ. As now (0) > (1) from the point of view of q(t), then
(t∗) > (t∗ + 1). In general, (t) > (t + 1) for any pair of strategies. Summing
up we have that (0) < (1) < ... < (t∗ − 1) < (t∗) > (t∗ + 1) > ... > (∞) and
the optimal strategy is of type (t).
Assumption 2 does not play a role in cases (i) and (ii). However, it does the
following case. In it the DM would have preferred to switch from difficult
to easy at some point. We look for the optimal strategies within the ones
prescribed by assumption 2.
(iii) Suppose that q(0), qd ≤ µ < qe. Whenever t ≤ t∗ − 1, (t + 1) > (t) and in
particular (t∗) > (t∗ − 1). At t∗, it follows that (t∗) > (t∗ + 1). In general,
whenever t > t∗, (t) > (t+ 1). We have that (0) < (1) < ... < (t∗− 1) < (t∗) >
(t∗ + 1) > ... > (∞) and the optimal strategy is of type (t).
The result is then established.

Proof of Proposition 3. We have three cases depending on the optimal strategy.
Case 1. (0) is optimal. We have u((0)) = K
∑∞
i=0 δ
i(q(i)p22 + (1− q(i))p12). By
Claim 2, q(i) = q(0)(T d)i+p12
∑i−1
j=0(T
d)j . Thus, we rewrite u((0)) = K
∑∞
i=0 δ
i(q(i)T d+
p12) or KT
dq(0)
∑∞
i=0(δT
d)i + p12T
dK
∑∞
i=0 δ
i
∑i−1
j=0(T
d)j + Kp12
∑∞
i=0 δ
i. Then
∂u((0))/∂q(0) = KT d(1− δT d)−1 > 0.
Case 2. (∞) is optimal. We have u((∞)) = ∑∞i=0 δi(q(i)p21 + (1− q(i))p11). We
follow exactly the same reasoning than in case 1, and thus omit it here, to conclude
that ∂u((∞))/∂q(0) = T e(1− δT e)−1 > 0.
In both cases utility is increasing and linear in q(0). Since T d > T e, the marginal
return of an increase in q(0) is higher under (0) than under (∞).
Case 3. (t) is optimal. We have u((t)) =
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)p21 + (1 − q(i))p11) +
K
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)p22+(1−q(i))p12). Let us focus first on
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)p21+(1−q(i))p11).
By Claim 2, q(i) = q(0)(T e)i + p11
∑i−1
j=0(T
e)j . Thus,
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)T e + p11) =∑t−1
i=0 δ
i((q(0)(T e)i + p11
∑i−1
j=0(T
e)j)T e + p11). This expression is equivalent to
q(0)T e
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(T e)i+T e
∑t−1
i=0 δ
ip11
∑i−1
j=0(T
e)j+
∑t−1
i=0 δ
ip11. Its derivative with re-
spect to q(0) is T e
∑t−1
i=0(δT
e)i > 0. Consider now, K
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)p22 + (1− q(i))p12).
By Claim 2 q(t+i) = q(t)(T d)i + p12
∑i−1
j=0(T
d)j . Thus, we rewrite the previous
expression as K(
∑∞
i=0 δ
t+i((q(t)(T d)i + p12
∑i−1
j=0(T
d)j)T d + p12)). This is equiv-
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alent to K(q(t)T d
∑∞
i=0 δ
t+i(T d)i + T d
∑∞
i=0 δ
t+ip12
∑∞
j=0(T
d)j +
∑∞
i=0 δ
t+ip12)).
The part that depends on q(t) is equivalent to q(t)KδtT d/(1 − δT d)−1. By Claim
2 we express it as (q(0)(T d)t + p12
∑t−1
i=0(T
d)i)KδtT d/(1− δT d)−1. Taking deriva-
tives w.r.t q(0) we get Kδt(T d)t+1/(1− δT d)−1 > 0. Thus, we have ∂u((t))/∂q(0) =
T e
∑t−1
i=0(δT
e)i +Kδt(T d)t+1/(1− δT d)−1 > 0.
Notice that we can express u((0)) = K
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)T d+p12)+K
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)T d+
p12) and u((∞)) =
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)T e + p11) +
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)T e + p11). Similar algebra
as in the case in which (t) is optimal yields ∂u((0))/∂q(0) = KT d
∑t−1
i=0(δT
d)i +
Kδt(T d)t+1/(1 − δT d)−1 and ∂u((∞))/∂q(0) = T e∑t−1i=0(δT e)i + δt(T e)t+1/(1 −
δT e)−1, respectively. Since T d > T e, then ∂u((0))/∂q(0) > ∂u((t))/∂q(0) and
∂u((t))/∂q(0) > ∂u((∞))/∂q(0) holds. We also compare the marginal return of any
pair of intermediate strategies (t− 1) and (t). In this case t− 1 ≥ 1. We have that
∂u((t− 1))/∂q(0) = T e∑t−2i=0(δT e)i +Kδt−1(T d)t/(1− δT d)−1 and ∂u((t))/∂q(0) =
T e
∑t−1
i=0(δT
e)i +Kδt(T d)t+1/(1− δT d)−1. Subtracting the second expression from
the first we get δt−1(K(T d)t − (T e)t) which is positive since T d > T e. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider case (ii) in table 2 in the main body. Let us denote
by q(0)
′
the initial probability in any of the cases in which (0) is optimal. Let us
also denote by q(0) the initial probability in the case in which (t) is optimal. Notice
that q(0)
′
> q(0). Consider the utility of (t) when the DM is characterized by q(0)
′
,
that is, when (0) is optimal. It has to be higher than the utility of (t) when the
DM is characterized by q(0), that is, when precisely, (t) is optimal. To see this,
notice that up to t − 1 easy tasks are chosen. But since q(0)′ > q(0), by Claim 2,
q(i)
′
> q(i) for every i ≤ t − 1. Consider now time t on. By Claim 1, iterations
on q(i) approach qd from below without exceeding it. Notice, also by Claim 1, that
iterations on q(i)
′
may approach qd from below or from above, without exceeding
it.31 In the former case, also by Claim 2, q(i)
′
> q(i) for every i ≥ t. In the latter
case, by Claim 1, q(i)
′
> qd > q(i) for i ≥ t. Since current expected utility increases
with q(0), it has to be that u((t)) is higher under q(0)
′
than under q(0). Also, under
q(0)
′
, u((0)) > u((t)) by optimality. Summing up u((0)) under q(0)
′
is higher than
u((t)) under q(0)
′
and u((t)) under q(0)
′
is higher utility than u((t)) under q(0). The
result is then established.

Proof of Lemma 2. Consider that the DM is characterized by q(0). By the proof of
31The behavior of q(i)
′
depends on whether in approaching qe, qd is exceeded or not. In the cases in which
q(i)
′
> qd, by Claim 2, the stationary state is approached from above.
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Theorem 2, under q(0) < qd < qe < µ′, (∞) is optimal whereas under q(0) < µ <
qd < qe, (t) is optimal. By the proof of Theorem 2, µ is decreasing in K, thus µ < µ′
is associated to K ′ < K. By optimality of (t) we have that
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)T e + p11) +
K
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)T d + p12) >
∑t−1
i=0 δ
i(q(i)T e + p11) +
∑∞
i=t δ
i(q(i)T e + p11). Since we
consider the case in which q(0) as well as probabilities of success affecting qd and
qe are the same, when either (∞) or (t) are optimal, the RHS of this expression
brings exactly the same utility that when, indeed, (∞) is optimal, that is, when
q(0) < qd < qe < µ′. Thus, u((t)) under q(0) < µ < qd < qe is higher than u((∞))
under q(0) < qd < qe < µ′.32 
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